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I. INTRODUCTION

Ten years ago, Justice Brotherton, writing for a majority of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia, noted that:
Punishing a person who doesn't understand what he is doing or
can't control his actions would take us back to the time when the
mentally ill were randomly incarcerated or tortured with demonic
witch cures. It would be a cruel and senseless act, comparable with
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kicking a dog for disobeying a written command.'
The classic example of such a person is the husband who strangles his wife, all the
time suffering from the delusion that he is squeezing a lemon. This situation was
laid out some forty years ago by the drafters of the Model Penal Code to justify the
inclusion of an affirmative defense to certain crimes based upon the mental
condition of the defendant at the time of the crime.2
In Samples, Justice Brotherton further noted that, "[t]hose suffering from
mental illnesses have a right to be treated and not punished. For this right to be
meaningful, the criminal defendant must have a fair opportunity to present evidence
of his insanity at trial and to rebut any evidence which would tend to prove his
sanity."3 While the dicta contained in this footnote suggests a rational approach by
the court to.a very serious problem, the reality in today's criminal justice system is
continue to be particularly vulnerable to criminal discovery
that the mentally ill
rules. These rules apparently deny the mentally ill the information necessary to
assert a defense based upon their illness.
West Virginia has made great strides since the 1960's in the liberalization
of discovery in the criminal setting.' Yet, many areas remain where improvement
is necessary. As then Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., said, "the
quest for better justice is a ceaseless quest ....Law's evolution is never done, and
for every improvement made there is another reform that is overdue."5 This Note
is focused on one such area - the lack of pretrial disclosure of police reports and
witness statements as it relates to the defendant's "fair opportunity to present
evidence of his insanity at trial." Section I of this Note illustrates the seriousness
of the problem with the current discovery process in criminal trials through the use
of a dramatized scenario. Section I of this Note presents the elements of the debate
concerning psychological defenses in criminal trials as they relate to the discovery
process. Section IV looks at the various alternatives available to defense counsel in
West Virginia when faced with the situation laid out in Section II. And finally,
' State v. Samples, 328 S.E.2d 191, 194 n.4 (W. Va.1985).
2 MODELPENAL

CODE § 4.01 cmt. 156 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).

3 Samples, 328 S.E.2d at 194 n.4.
4 For a discussion of the advances made in criminal procedure in West Virginia, see Richard B. Pyles,

CriminalProcedure-Discovery-MovementTowardFullDisclosure, 77 W. VA. L. REV. 561 (1975).
William . Brennan, Jr., The CriminalProsecution:Sporting Event or Questfor Truth? A Progress
Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1990).
'

6

Samples, 328 S.E.2d at 194 n.4.
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Section V concludes with a proposal for revamping the discovery rules in West
Virginia to place the burden of non-production on the prosecution in criminal trials.

II. THE SCENARIO

7

Consider the following situation. An indigent, Rogers, is charged with the
first-degree murder of his ex-wife's new husband. Rogers allegedly drove to his exwife's home, met the new husband in front of the house and, after a brief argument,
shot the new husband with a rifle. Suppose also that Rogers has a history of mental
difficulties.
A local attorney is appointed to represent Rogers. Upon evaluation of the
case, the defense attorney contacts a local psychiatrist to examine Rogers to
determine his mental capacities. Since Rogers is charged with first-degree murder,
the defense attorney wants to know if Rogers formed the necessary criminal intent
to be convicted of premeditated murder.
The defense psychiatrist proceeds to collect the necessary information for
her examination and report. To that end, she writes a letter to the prosecuting
attorney seeking the police report, along with any eyewitness statements, concerning
the alleged crime. In the letter, the defense psychiatrist indicates her need for such
information to make an informed and proper assessment of Rogers' condition. The
request for this type of information is standard operating procedure for the defense
psychiatrist anytime she is asked to perform a criminal responsibility evaluation.
In the past, she has routinely received open access to the prosecution's files.
Contrary to the defense psychiatrist's previous experiences, the prosecuting
attorney refuses this request. The prosecuting attorney indicates that the defense is
not entitled to any of this information prior to trial. Therefore, he will not provide
the information to the defense psychiatrist. Instead, the prosecuting attorney
petitions for a government psychiatric evaluation pursuant to the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 8 The court grants the prosecution's request. Rogers is ordered to report

7 The preceding dramatized scenario is based in large part on the real events of State v. Allen. State

v. Allen, No. 95-F-72-1 (15th Cir. W. Va. 1995). Telephone Interview with William Fremouw,
William Fremouw, Ph.D. & Associates, Morgantown, W. Va. (Jan. 29, 1997). Interview with James
M. Pool, in Clarksburg, W. Va. (Jan. 28, 1997). The information used to formulate this scenario was
gleaned from the public records maintained by the Circuit Clerk of Harrison County for the Allen case
and interviews with the defense attorney and psychologist. Allen is now the subject of a Petition for
Appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. Pet. for Appeal, Allen v. State, No. 95-F72-1 (15th Cir. W. Va. 1995). The appeal is based upon the discovery issue, along with several other
important but unrelated issues.
8

W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c) provides that "fi]n an appropriate case the court may, upon motion of the

attorney for the state, order the defendant to submit to a mental examination by a psychiatrist or other
expert designated for this purpose in the order of the court." Id.
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for an evaluation by the state's psychiatrist. Naturally, the government psychiatrist
is given access to the police report and the eyewitness statements for his pretrial
assessment
The defense attorney asks his psychiatrist to proceed with her evaluation
anyway. The defense psychiatrist's report indicates that Rogers was likely
functioning with diminished capacity at the time of the alleged crime, but notes that
her evaluation is incomplete without the information she originally sought from the

prosecution. The defense attorney immediately moves for a court order for the
production of the subject information by the prosecution.9
At the hearing on the defense motion, the prosecution points out that Rule
16(a)(2) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically exempts such
information from pretrial discovery by the defense.1 0 The defense attorney argues

that, under Rule 16(a)(1)(C), the information was "material" for the preparation of
the defense case." The defense attorney also indicates that he will not seek personal
disclosure of the information. Rather, some sort of court supervised review of the
documents by the psychiatrist alone is sufficient for his purposes.' He desires no

9 Rule 16(a)(1)(C) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is identical to the Federal
Rule of the same number, provides in pertinent part:
(C) Documents and Tangible Objects.-Upon request of the defendant, the state
shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers,
documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or
portions thereot which are within the possession, custody and control of the state,
and which are material to the preparation of the defense or are intended for use
by the state as evidence in chief at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the
defendant
W. VA. R. CaJM. P. 16(a)(1)(C).
Rule 16(d) gives the court, upon motion by the requesting party, the power to order the nonmoving party to comply with a discovery request. W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1), 16(d)(2).
Rule 16(a)(2) provides in pertinent part:
(2) Information Not Subject to Disclosure.-Except as provided in paragraphs (A),
(B), (D)and (E) of subdivision (a)(1), this rule does not authorize the discovery
or inspection of reports, memoranda or other internal official documents made by
the attorney for the state or other state officials in connection with the
investigation or prosecution of the case, or of statements made by state witnesses
or prospective state witnesses except as provided in Rule 26.2.
W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2).
1

I W.VA.IL CRM.P. 16(a)(1)(C).
2 The court is vested with the authority to "restrict" the discovery requested and to "specify the time,
place and manner of making the discovery and inspection and may prescribe such terms and conditions

as are just." W. VA. R. CRiM. P. 16(d)(1), (d)(2).
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further use of the requested documents, other than the review by the psychiatrist for
preparation of the expert report and subsequent testimony. The trial court agrees
that such information is exempt from pretrial discovery and denies the defense
motion. Acting upon a motion by the prosecution, the trial court further orders that,
upon any mention of the unproduced information, the court will immediately
instruct the jury that the prosecution was well within their rights to deny the subject
information to the defense.
At the trial of the matter, the defense tries to poke holes in the prosecution's
case through cross-examination. However, when it is time to proceed with Rogers'
case-in-chief, the defense attorney cannot put the defense psychiatrist on the stand.
The defense attorney knows that the prosecution still has the initial letter from the
psychiatrist seeking the documentation. He knows that, on cross-examination, his
expert witness will be forced to admit that the examination was incomplete without
the sought-after information. Additionally, he knows that after the prosecution has
used that admission to destroy his expert, the trial court will instruct the jury that the
prosecution had acted properly and with full authority in denying the information
to the defense. His expert witness is a "sitting duck" for the prosecution. The
prosecution will never have to call their own expert (such a move will likely entitle
the defense to receive the sought-after information after the prosecution expert
testified under Rule 26.2 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure). 3 After
the defense expert has been destroyed, there will be no need for rebuttal. So, after
all is said and done, the defendant is left without a viable defense as to the issue of
criminal intent and is found guilty by the jury of murder in the first-degree.
EE. THE INSANITY DEFENSE DEBATE: EASY ROAD TO FREEDOM OR
RESPONSIBILITY CALCULUS

The above-described situation is entirely possible under the common-lawbased discovery portions of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure. At the
same time that the mental health sciences are trying to grapple with serious problems
in the area of accurate diagnosis of insanity and diminished capacity (as it relates to

,3 Rule 26.2(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is identical to Rule 26.2(a)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides in pertinent part:
(a) Motion for production. -After a witness other than the defendant has testified
on direct examination, the court, on motion of a party who did not call the witness,
shall order the attorney for the state or the defendant and the defendant's attorney,
as the case may be, to produce for examination and use of the moving party any
statement of the witness that is in their possession and that relates to the subject
matter concerning which the witness has testified.
NV. VA. R. CRa. P. 26.2(a).
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the legal definitions), 4 the legal system is undergoing serious changes in the area

of the insanity defense and related alternatives. 5 Also, on top of this hostile
environment, the common law criminal discovery process provides the government
with yet another tool to restrict criminal defendants' access to vital information. 16
A.

The Criticisms ofMental Health Defenses

Two different criminal defenses dominate the debate on mental health and
the law - insanity and diminished capacity. Both defenses are concerned with the
mens rea requirements of certain crimes,17 but they operate in totally different
ways."8 Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity (NGR1) is an affiTmative defense. NGRI
absolves the defendant of any blame due to a significant mental impairment existing
at the time of the alleged offenses such that the defendant can not form any of the

14 SEYMOUR L. HALLECK, ThE MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDER 51 (1986). Dr.

Halleck asserts

that:
In the process of determining insanity, the criminal justice system almost always
requests the assistance of psychiatrists and psychologists. They are asked to
evaluate defendants some time after the crime has taken place and to speculate
about their mental condition at the time of the crime.... Even if defendants
appear to be mentally ill at the time of the insanity examination, it is not easy to
determine if this illness was present or if it in fact exerted significant influence
upon them at the time of their crimes.
Id; see also infra notes 73-88.
'5

See inffra notes 34-38.

16

One commentator has explained that:

Pretrial discovery is the disclosure of information about a case prior to the
commencement of the trial. In civil cases ... [t]his process, when properly
employed, virtually eliminates trial by surprise. In criminal cases, however,
almost the reverse is true; defense counsel is frequently surprised at trial by some
unknown development This perplexing situation is due to the common law,
which precludes all pretrial discovery in criminal cases. Thus, the seemingly
absurd result arises from this common law rule when parties to a minor civil suit
receive all the information they need to adequately prepare for their day in court,
but a defendant on trial for murder has extremely limited access to information in
the hands of the prosecutor.
Pyles, supra note 4, at 561.

"7 Charles R. Clark, Specific Intent and Diminished Capacity, in HANDBOOK OF FoRENsIc
PSYCHOLOGY 352 (Irving B. Weiner & Allen K. Hess eds., 1987).
" Id at354.
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mental requirements necessary to the offense. 9 On the other hand, the defense of
diminished capacity argues that the defendant did not have the necessary specific
intent required to be convicted of the underlying offense.2" Unlike insanity,
diminished capacity does not absolve the defendant of any criminal wrongdoing.2
The defense of diminished capacity merely seeks to lower the offense to one not
involving specific intent because the defendant was only capable of general intent
due to his or her mental defect' Both defenses have come under increasing attack,
as illustrated by the cases of John W. Hinckley, Jr. and Jeffrey Dahmer.
The Hinckley and Dahmer cases garnered wide publicity for criminal
responsibility assessments.' Both cases drew nationwide attention to the issue of
psychiatric defenses to criminal charges. Hinckley, the would-be assassin of then
President Ronald Reagan, was found not guilty by reason of insanity.' An ABC
News poll taken after the Hinckley verdict indicated that seventy-six percent of
Americans believed that justice had been denied.26 Within one month after Hinckley
was found not guilty by reason of insanity, another public opinion poll found that
eighty-seven percent of the respondents "viewed the insanity defense as a
loophole." The same survey found that, based upon the information they had, only
14.7% of the respondents would have found Hinckley not guilty by reason of

insanity.2'

In contrast to Hinckley, Jeffrey Dahmer, the cannibalistic mass murderer

1Id. at 353.
HALLECK, supra note 14, at 59-60.
21Clark, supranote

17, at 353.

2

Id

21

RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND CRUMINAL CULPABIrUY 1 (1995).

24

Id.

2 id.
2 Id.

Stephen L. Golding &Ronald Roesch, The Assessment of CriminalResponsibility: A Historical
Approach to a Current Controversy, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 395, 409 (Irving B.
Weiner & Allen K.Hess eds., 1987) (citing V.P. Hans & D.Slater, John Hincldey,Jr.and the Insanity
Defense: The Public's Verdict, 47 PUB. OPINION Q.202-12 (1983)).
27

28

Id
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from Milwaukee, was unsuccessful in his insanity plea. 9 Yet, similar sampling
surrounding the Dahmer case showed considerable disturbance about the insanity
plea and relief that it failed." Most importantly, however, in both cases, "public
opinion was generally negative not only as to the insanity defense but also as to the
psychiatric testimony."3' The basic fear has been that the insanity plea provides
'
"psychotic killers" with an "easy road to freedom."32
A recent poll showed that
eighty-seven percent of the respondents believe that the insanity defense "allows too
many guilty people to go free."' 33
Hinckley's acquittal apparently catalyzed a trend toward eliminating the
availability of these defenses.' In 1984, Congress enacted the Insanity Defense
Reform Act, with the intent of eliminating the use of misconduct-excusing
affirmative defenses. 35 At least twelve jurisdictions have adopted the Guilty But
Mentally Ill alternative 6 Montana, Idaho and Utah have gone so far as to eliminate
the insanity defense, although they have left the door open to element-specific
defenses, such as diminished capacity.37 All told, between 1978 and 1990, some 124
different attempts were made to reform the insanity defense in thirty-four

SLOVENKo, supra note 23, at 1.
30

Id

31 ma
32 Id at

179.

31 Id at

180.

' HALLECK, supra note 14, at 50.
31 John S. Anooshian, Comment CriminalLaw-Mental Illness-Insanity Defense Reform Act Does

Not Bar Defendantfrom Offering PsychiatricEvidence ofMentalAbnormalityon Issue ofMens Rea,
20 RUTGERS L.J. 271,276-78 (1988).
Golding & Roesch, supra note 27, at 412. "Then United States Attorney General William French
Smith was more blunt and predicted that adopting the guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) option 'would
36

effectively eliminate the insanity defense."' Id. at 409 (citations omitted).
The method by which the GBMI verdict was designed to eliminate the insanity defense was
subtle. The GBMI verdict was not intended to replace the NGRI verdict Id. at 413. Instead, the

GBMI verdict was designed to give jurors a middle ground between guilty and NGRI. Id. The GBMI
verdict was "intended to make it harder to reach a verdict of [NGRI] (especially in gray areas of severe
personality disorder) with the hope that most jurors would respond to the superficial logic of the
verdict ('Okay, he's crazy, but he did it, didn't he?')." Id.
" Ju!ie Shoop, High CourtLets States BarInsanity Plea,TRIAL, June 1994, at 98, 99.
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jurisdictions." Unfortunately, the premises upon which these criticisms and
attempts to eliminate mental health defenses are based fail upon closer examination.
The underlying belief that mental defenses are growing in number is false.
In actuality, the assertion of the insanity defense is relatively rare.39 'The insanity
defense is successfully applied in less than one percent (actually 0.7%) of all felony
cases.' Although no concrete numbers exist, the defense of diminished capacity is
generally believed to be even less commonplace than the insanity defense.4
Contrary to notions of abuse of the insanity defense, studies have shown that
practically all of those actually found not guilty by reason of insanity are among the
most disturbed individuals.42
Likewise, the fear that these defenses are "easy road[s] to freedom ' 3 is
unfounded. Those adjudged to be criminally insane generally serve sentences equal
to their sane counterparts.' The overwhelming majority of the cases are settled by

38 Mark A. Woodmansee, The Guilty But Mentally 1ll Verdict: PoliticalExpediency at the Expense

ofMoralPrinciple, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'Y 341, 345 (1996); see also HENRY J.
STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFrER H NCKLEY: EVALUATING INsANITY DEFENsE REFORM 35
(1993).
" Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristicsof Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight-State
Study, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PsYCHIATRY L. 331, 334 (1991) ("Across the 49 study counties in the
eight states, the insanity defense was raised in approximately one percent of all felony cases
(0.93%).'); see also Golding & Roesch, supra note 27, at 413 n.*; Jeffrey Janofsky et al., Defendants
PleadingInsanity: An Analysis of Outcome, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 203, 210 (1989);
Hugh McGinley & Richard A. Pasewark, NationalSurvey of the Frequency andSuccess of the Insanity
Plea andAlternatePleas, 17 . PSYCHIATRY & L. 205,208 (1989).
o Golding & Roesch, supra note 27, at 413 n.*.
4' Clark, supra note 17, at 352.
42 According to one study:

Only 10 percent of the population raising the defense did not receive a DSM-1lI
diagnosis, and the large majority had a prior hospitalization. Furthermore, only
the most disturbed defendants were successful in their plea. The popular concept
that the insanity defense is an "easy out" for defendants who are either feigning
mental illness or who claim temporary insanity is clearly untrue.
Callahan et al., supra note 39, at 337.
4 SLOVENKO, supra note 23, at 179.
Golding and Roesch have stated that "postacquittal release procedures are quite strict in most states,
and most of the available evidence indicates that [not guilty by reason of insanity] ngri acquittees
spend as much or more time confined as do those convicted of similar crimes." Golding & Roesch,
supranote 27, at 413 n.* (citations omitted).
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agreement, without going to a jury.45 In most situations, the various professionals,

including prosecution experts, agree about the diagnosis of the defendant.46
Nonetheless, the fear of crime and insensitivity to the mentally ill has made the
public skeptical of the insanity defense.4 7 The media are partly to blame.
The occasional contested case (such as Hinckley or Dahmer) receives all of
the media attention and fans the flames of discontent.4" The public depends on the

media for most of its information about the criminal justice system.49 Unfortunately,

the media focuses its attention on "uniquely aberrational" high profile cases,5 such
as Lorena Bobbitt and the Menendez brothers.5 The notoriety of these cases has
fueled the public fear that the justice system is replete with such "daytime talk
show" defendants.52 This hapless development unfairly maligns and improperly
distorts the prevalence of psychological defenses.

4sCommentators conducting an eight state survey have observed that:
Finally, these data indicate that the decision to acquit someone was seldom made
by a jury; only seven percent of 2,500 acquittals were disposed of by a jury.
Rather, the decision to acquit was made by other key players in the criminal
justice process including the prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge. It's clear
that negotiation plays a central role in the insanity plea, just as it does in other
areas of the criminal justice process.
Callahan et al., supranote 39, at 337.
According to one group of commentators:
Although the insanity defense is frequently portrayed as a war between hired
guns, in Baltimore City, at least, there is remarkable agreement between both
sides. Only two cases (1.4% of those pleading NCR and 0.02% of all those
indicted in Baltimore City during the same time period) had full-blown insanity
trials. With respect to the remaining defendants, they either dropped their insanity
pleas, or else all sides agreed as to the defendant's insanity.
Janofsky et al., supra note 39, at 210.
41 Shoop, supra note 37, at 99.
41 Janofsky et al., supra note 39, at 210.
49 Peter Arenella, Demystifying the Abuse Excuse: Is There One?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 703,

705 (1996).
50Id.
5'Id. at 705-07.
Karla Leeper & Jon Bruschke, The Prevalence of the Abuse Excuse: Media Hype or Causefor
Concern?, COMM. & L., Dec. 1995, at 47,48.
32
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The Role of Cognitive Responsibilityin the CriminalJustice System

The rush to eliminate the insanity defense and related alternatives is
especially troubling because of the central role of such defenses in our criminal
justice system. The issue of mens rea or a "guilty mind" has been fundamental to
our system of criminal justice since its inception.5 3 One of the fundamental
principles of Anglo-American law is that mental guilt, or mens rea, must be
involved in the commission of certain crimes.' If the mental elements of the crime
are not present, the conviction cannot be sustained." These offenses are generally
referred to as specific intent crimes.5 6 Specific intent offenses generally involve a
higher level of criminal liability than general intent offenses and are done
purposefully or knowingly.57
Our American system ofjustice is infused with notions of morality. 8 Those
individuals who act contrary to the community's established norms deserve
punishment if they are "fully blameworthy." 9 Conversely, if an individual is not
fully able to appreciate the blameworthy nature of her conduct, then the same level
of punishment is not appropriate.' As Professor H.L.A. Hart explained:

5 Commentators have noted that:
It is well established within the historical and jurisprudential literatures that the
fundamental concept of mens rea within Judeo-Christian cultures has been in
existence since the earliest recordings of Hebrew law....
One can show that the entire structure of the criminal law is built upon
this principle. No society seems ever to have been without this means, even if
archaic.
Golding & Roesch, supra note 27, at 397-98 (citations omitted).
Clark, supranote 17, at 352.
SId at352.

A specific intent crime is defined as a "[c]rime in which [the] defendant must not only intend the
act charged, but also intend to violate law. One in which a particular intent is a necessary element of
the crime itself." BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 973 (abr. 6th ed. 1991); see also Clark, supra note 17,
at 353.
56

" Clark, supra note 17, at 353.
s Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessingthe RelationshipBetween Legaland
MoralAccountability, 39 UCLAL. REV. 1511, 1517 (1992).
51 Woodmansee, supra note 38, at 370.
60id.
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At the conviction stage, if punishment is to be justified at all, the
criminal's act must be that of a responsible agent: that is, it must
be the act of one who could have kept the law which he has broken.
And at the sentencing stage, the punishment must bear some sort of
relationship to the act: it must in some sense "fit" or be
"proportionate."61
In this regard, psychological and psychiatric testimony is generally regarded by
most jurisdictions as both germane and helpful to the criminal justice system.62
Jurors must assess the defendant's mental condition - his capacity to make knowing
and conscious choices - before they can assign blame.' Judges and juries rely upon
the expert opinions of mental health professionals in determining the proper
disposition of persons asserting these defenses.'
The insanity and diminished capacity defenses serve another important
purpose for the criminal justice system. These defenses reserve exculpation for the
most severely impaired defendants.65 By necessary implication, all other defendants
are responsible for their actions.' As a result, the government can justify the use
of its coercive power over those individuals.67 The substantive requirement of
culpability legitimizes this exercise of power by restricting its use to those most
responsible and lessening its impact over those less blameworthy.6" Likewise, the
community's criticism of criminal conduct is strengthened by the mental element
requirement 69 As a consequence, the boundary between acceptable and

61

H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 160 (1982).

'2

Gordon B. Bums, The Right to the Effective Assistance of a PsychiatristUnder Ake v. Oklahoma,

30 CRM.L. BULL. 429, 432-33 (1994).
6'Woodmansee, supra note 38, at 369.
4 Clark, supra note 17, at 352.
6
66

HALLECK,

supra note 14, at 47.

d

67 Arenella, supra note 58, at 1533.
68 id

69 Id at 1620.
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unacceptable behavior is reinforced."
Finally, rejection of mental condition defenses necessarily implies a lack of
confidence in the science of psychology. Contrary to popular belief, "[w]ell trained
and conscientious mental health professionals have always attempted to be
punctiliously correct in the testimony they offer to the courts and have been at the
'
forefront of attempts to reform standards of training and practice."71
Most of the
attacks upon these experts appear to be politically motivated rather than factual.'
As the following discussion shows, the forensic psychological community is seeking
to prevent any future abuse of the insanity and diminished capacity defenses.
C.

The Risk Of "Malingering"

One of the persistent worries among those skeptical of defenses based upon
mental defect is the fear of what scientists label "malingering." Malingering is the
attempt on the part of an individual to deliberately deceive or create the impression
of a mental disorder where none exists. 3
Malingering presents a particularly difficult problem for the forensic
psychologist.74 The legal system asks the forensic psychologist to render an opinion
as to the mental condition of a defendant at a point in time well before the date of
the evaluation.75 In addition, the forensic psychologist must be on guard against the
self-serving motivations of the patient 76 The job is even more difficult in view of

70

Id

"

Golding & Roesch, supranote 27, at 424.

72

d

71 DAVID L. SHAPIRO, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION AND EXPERT TESTIMONY:

A PRACICAL GuIDE

TO FORENSIC WORK 11-12 (1984).
74Id.

75HALEK, supra note 14, at51.
76Two commentators caution that:

In a forensic setting, the psychologist must consider that the client may desire to
create a certain picture of the self,so that memory and behavior are being altered,
hidden, distorted, or created for self-serving reasons.... "The defendant's
symptom reports simply cannot be taken at face value without independent
verification, nor can it be assumed that the defendant's primary interest is
necessarily to obtain relief from private suffering caused by the disorder....
Only after malingering has been successfully excluded can we begin to apply

usual diagnostic criteria."
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the fact that the forensic psychologist is often required to perform this evaluation
with only limited opportunity for interviewing the defendant and even less access
to the accounts of others present at the time of the alleged crime.' To provide an
accurate diagnosis, these variables must be minimized."' Clearly, the delay between
the event and the evaluation is often unavoidable. However, the access to the
information variable is well within the control of the criminal justice system.
D.

The Need for "Collateral"Information

To successfully negotiate around the possibility that the patient is actually
"malingering," the scientific community has uniformly expressed the need for
additional information. 9 Commentator after commentator in the field of forensic
psychology has called for the review of many sources of information, especially
official accounts of the events of the crime and eyewitness statements.8"
Forensic psychological experts need access to additional records, including
police reports, witness statements, family interviews, jail records, and any records
concerning the defendant's' post-arrest behavior.8 The reasoning is simple.
Witnesses, in their own language, can describe how a person was behaving at the
time of the event' Post-arrest records and police reports are significant, in that they
can be compared to one another, and considered with the patient interview, to
establish patterns in the defendant's behavior.' All of this data is necessary to
provide the "big picture" that is indispensable in the search for the truth about a

Margaret T. Singer & Abraham Nievod, Consulting and Testifying in Court, in HANDBOOK OF
FORENsIC PsYCHOLOGY 529, 531-32 (Irving B. Weiner & Allen K. Hess eds., 1987).
" Thomas Grisso, ClinicalAssessments for Legal Decisionmaking:Research Recommendations, in
LAwAINDMENrAL HEALTH 49,60-61 (Saleem A. Shah & Bruce D. Sales, eds., 1991); SHAPIRO, supra
note 73, at 12.
78 See

"

infra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.

'0 Grisso, supra note 77, at 60-61; SHAPIRO, supra note 73, at 12; Singe &Nievod, supranote 76, at
534.
" SHAPIRO, supra note 73, at 51-52.
82Id
Id at 52-53.
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defendant's mental condition.'
The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources recognizes
the need for full information in the evaluative process. The Department has issued
a policy paper for the preparation of court-ordered psychological evaluations.85 The
directive indicates, among other things, that:
The Department requests the Court's assistance in assuring that the
following information on the individual to be evaluated is available
at the time of admission to the unit.
*
A copy of the police report of the alleged crime
*
A copy of the evidence report
*
A copy of any written or recorded statements
made by the defendant arresting officers, or
witnesses to the alleged crime.86
Thus, when West Virginia courts order a defendant to be evaluated, the state agency
charged with this evaluation has a set of guidelines in place to prescribe what
information is essential to the evaluation.87 Yet, when a defendant contracts with his
own expert (which, by the way, often comes from the same pool of individuals used
by the State), the adversarial nature of our system ofjustice presents a barrier to the
acquisition of this vital information."
E.

Roadblocks to the Productionof CollateralInformation

Despite the considerable liberalization of the discovery rules in criminal
proceedings that has occurred over the past thirty years, many states, along with the
federal system, still do not provide for the pretrial production of witness statements

84

Id. at 182-83.

WEST VIRGINIA DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES,
CLIENT SERVICES POLICY No. 3127, reprintedin EVALUATIONS FOR WEST VIRGINIA COURTS: A
85 BuREAu OF HuMAN RESOURCES,

RESOURCE BOOK (Division of Mental Health and Community Rehabilitation Services ed., 1996).
16

Id. at 6.

87

The above guidelines were promulgated by the Department for the express purpose of outlining the

procedures to be followed when the Department is called upon by the courts to evaluate a defendant.

Id at 1.
88 SHAPIRO, supra note 73, at 51.
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or other documents.8 9 Many of the most important documents in a criminal case are
"material to the preparation of the defense" as defined by Rule 16(a)(1)(C) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (and the identical provision of the West

Virginia Rules)'

and are specifically exempted from production by the

corresponding provision of Rule 16(a)(2). 91
Under West Virginia law, police reports are not discoverable, unless used
at trial to refresh recollection.' Likewise, defense investigator's reports are not
subject to pretrial discovery.' In addition, witness statements obtained by the
government are exempt from pretrial discovery, no matter how "material."' In
contrast to a civil litigant, a criminal defendant is, therefore, entitled to rather limited
discovery, despite the rather broad looking provisions of Rule 16(a)(1)(C) 5
In addition, trial court discretion in this area is of little help to the defendant.
Although the trial court has broad discretion in matters of discovery,' the decision
of the trial court in this regard is only reviewable when the trial court has abused its
discretion.' The only exceptions to this standard are the duty of the prosecutor to

s Brennan, supra note 5,at 10-11.
9 See supra note 9.
91 See supranote 10.

2 State v. Audia, 301 S.E.2d 199,210 (W. Va.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 934 (1983)..
9 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 235 n.8 (1975).
94 Audia, 301

S.E.2d at 210.

95The United States Supreme Court has ruled that:
A criminal defendant is entitled to rather limited discovery, with no general right
to obtain the statements of the Government's witnesses before they have testified.
Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 16(a)(2), 26.2. In a civil case, by contrast, a party is
entitled as a general matter to discovery of any information sought if it appears
"reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b)(1).
Degen v. UnitedStates, 116 S.Ct. 1777, 1781-82 (1996).
96Audia, 301 S.E.2d at 201, Syl. Pt. 8 (involving trial court denial to armed robbery defendant pretrial

disclosure of police reports and witness statements); State v. Bennett, 339 S.E.2d 213, Syl. Pt. 4 (W.
Va. 1985) (involving prosecutorial withholding of court-ordered discovery of witness information);
State v. Roy, 460 S.E.2d 277, 283 (W. Va. 1995) (involving trial court denial of sexual assault
defendant's motion to compel production of victim's counseling records).
9'Statev. Duell, 332 S.E.2d 246, Syl. Pt. 2 (W. Va. 1985), supersededon other grounds by rule, State
v. Sutphin, 466 S.E.2d 402 (W. Va. 1995).
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turn over exculpatory information98 and the right of the defendant to review notes
used by a witness to refresh his or her recollection. 9 Neither exception provides for
the pretrial discovery of the information necessary for a forensic psychologist's
evaluation."° Because Rule 16(a)(2) specifically excludes such information from
pretrial discovery, it is hard to imagine how a trial court could order such production
without abusing its discretion.
IV. ALTERNATIVES FOR AcQuIsmoN OF COLLATERAL INFORMATION

A.

Due ProcessChallenges

The United States Supreme Court, in Ake v. Oklahoma,' declared that
indigent defendants have a constitutional right to the assistance of a competent
psychiatric expert upon a preliminary showing that sanity will be an issue at trial."°
The principle underlying the decision in Ake was fundamental fairness under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment' 0 3 The Court in Ake noted that a
criminal defendant, indigent or otherwise, has a constitutional right to the "basic
tools of an adequate defense or appeal."' °
Certainly, the underlying premises of Ake apply to the instant debate.
Although the Court in Ake did not address the constitutional issues of criminal
discovery as they relate to the provision of a psychological expert, the implication
is that issues of sanity or other mental defect are vital to the just administration of
a criminal trial."°
Even though there is no general constitutional right to

"' Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
9 Bennett, 339 S.E2d at 220-21 n.5 (citing State v. Ashcraft, 309 S:E.2d 600, 606 n.4 (W. Va. 1983)).
,01
W. VA.R.-CRm.LP. 16(a)(2).
101470 U.S. 68 (1985), aff'd, 778 P.2d 460 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989).
'o Id. at 83.
103Id. at 76-77.
W'4 Id

at 77.

'l0'Id. at 80-81.
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discovery,"e6 where the constitutional right to a "competent psychiatrist"'0 7 collides
with the pretrial discovery exceptions of Rule 16(a)(2), the constitutional right
should prevail. Where the defendant is denied the discovery necessary to obtain a
minimally competent psychiatric evaluation for purposes of their defense,
"fundamental fairness" is in danger."1
In addition, the situation described at the outset of this Note poses another
constitutional problem. When a defendant's psychological expert is denied access
to the prosecution's records, insofar as they relate to the events surrounding the
alleged crime, a fundamental strategic advantage is gained by the prosecution.
For purposes of the forensic psychological evaluation, the prosecution's
records are unique."G The statements obtained by the police from eyewitnesses will
be the most proximate in time to the event. In addition, the police reports will
contain conclusions from physical evidence at the scene of the alleged crime. Under
the current Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defense will not be given access to this
information until each of these witnesses testifies at trial (assuming that the
prosecution uses all of its available witnesses). l Therefore, the efficacy of any
substitute information obtained by the defense in these regards will not be clear until
after the fact While this process may serve the defense for purposes of crossexamination, the forensic psychologist cannot use this information to realistically
evaluate the defendant at this late juncture of a trial."'
Furthermore, the prosecution is entitled to seek its own evaluation of the
defendant under Rule 12.2 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure."' The prosecution
will provide all of the information in its possession to its own psychiatric expert.
Thus, the prosecution's expert will have the benefit of far more information upon

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985), aft'd, 778 P.2d 460 (Okla. Crim.App. 1989).
10' Id. at
109

77.

This information is used to reconstruct the event and compensate for the delay between the event

and the psychological examination of the defendant Grisso, supranote 77, at 60-61.
In fact, at least one jurisdiction has founa a psychologist's testimony inadmissible for failure
to take into account the information gathered by the police investigating the crime. See State v.
Jackson, 457 S.E.2d 862, 868-70 (N.C. 1995).
10

W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2), 26.2.

". Golding & Roesch, supra note 27, at 420 (arguing that the information is needed prior to
interviewing the defendant to compare the defendant's statements against third-party statements).
112

See supra note 8.
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which to base his or her expert opinion than will the defense expert.
The Supreme Court in Ake noted that "unlike a private litigant, a State may
not legitimately assert an interest in maintenance of a strategic advantage over the
defense, if the result of that advantage is to cast a pall on the accuracy of the verdict
This would be the case in the instant situation. The strategic
obtained."'1
advantage gained by the prosecution and its expert would appear to have due
process implications.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has also shown a disdain
for prosecutorial advantages that mislead the jury. In State v. Duell the court was
faced with a question concerning competing psychological experts." 4 In Duell, the
prosecution's psychological expert performed tests which the prosecution failed to
turn over to the defense." 5 Applying notions of fair play and truthfulness, the court
noted that:
[T]he appellant was denied the opportunity to submit a second
opinion to the jury based upon the same evidence available to the
state psychiatrist. This could mislead the jury into believing that
the state psychiatrist possessed a superior data base from which his
opinion concerning the appellant's insanity was formulated." 6
The Court in Duell appeared to be concerned with the one-sidedness that can result
from having one expert operate from a position of advantage over the other in regard
to the informational basis for his or her opinion." 7 Such an interpretation of Duell
would also support an exception to the normal pretrial discovery prohibitions in the
case of forensic psychological experts. Surely, the important goal of giving the jury
a full and complete picture is never more implicated than when the sanity of the
defendant is at issue." 8 A falsely manufactured result either way would cast a
shadow over the whole criminal justice system.
'However attractive on its face, though, a due process challenge to pretrial
discovery is fraught with hardship. First, the Court in Ake did not address the

"3

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,79 (1985), affid, 778 P.2d 460 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989).

""

332 S.E.2d at 253.

11

Id at 249.

16

Id at253.

117

Id.

1

Id at251,253.
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discovery issue.119 Second, the current test for state criminal due process cases is
whether the state procedure "'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.""" 0
Although the mens rea of the defendant is an issue of traditional importance,' the
limiting nature of the criminal discovery process is also rooted in the common law
tradition." Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court is reticent to disturb the
rule-making authority of the individual states."
Third, beginning with its decision in Brady v. Maryland," the Supreme
Court has consistently required that, to prove a violation of a criminal's right of
access to information, there must be a showing that the evidence was "material
either to guilt or to punishment"' ' The Court in United States v. Bagley"6 set the
standard for "materiality" to be that the undisclosed evidence creates a "reasonable
probability" that the outcome would have been different. 2 7 As two commentators
noted, taking into account the Bagley decision, "the pro-discovery position appears
to have little chance of acceptance in the Court's foreseeable future.' 2 8

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 70 (1985) (addressing whether indigent defendant had
constitutional right to psychological expert assistance), afFd, 778 P.2d 460 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989).
"

' Medinav. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202
(1977) (citations omitted)).
1

See Golding & Roesch, supranote 53 and accompanying text.

'

See Pyles, supra note 16 and accompanying text.

123 The Court has cautioned that: "[lit has never been thought that [decisions under the Due Process

Clause] establish this Court as a rule-making organ for the promulgation of state rules of criminal
procedure." Medina, 505 U.S. at 443-44 (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 564 (1967)
(alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
124 373

'2
26

127

U.S. 83 (1963).

Id at 87.
473 U.S. 667 (1985).
Id at 682.

m H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, PresumedInnocent? Restrictionson Criminal Discovery
in FederalCourt Belie This Presumption,43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1089, 1107 (1991).
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B.

Liberal InterpretationofRule 16(a)(1)(C)

Liberal application of the concept of "materiality" within the context of
Rule 16(a)(1)(C) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure"z may satisfy
the need for a solution. At least one commentator argued for a similar interpretation
in the area of selective prosecution charges. 30 However, such an interpretation is
clouded by recentjurisprudence. This interpretation of Rule 16 was rejected by the
United States Supreme Court in the recent case of United States v. Armstrong.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, expressly rejected this application
to the area of selective prosecution as unrelated to the Government's "case-in, ,3
chief. 2
The Armstrong decision did, however, leave the door open to such an
interpretation in areas such as psychiatric defenses. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his
majority opinion, focused the debate on the symmetry of the language of Rule 16.13
While not speaking to the conflict between Rule 16(a)(1)(C) and Rule 16(a)(2), the
Chief Justice did indicate by inference that had the information been related to a
defense against the prosecution's "case-in-chief," it would be discoverable as
"material to the preparation of the defendant's defense" under Rule 16(a)(1)(C),
even though Rule 16(a)(2) exempts such evidence. 34 The reasoning of the majority
in Armstrong implies that Rule 16(a)(1)(C) takes precedence over Rule 16(a)(2).
In response to the defendant's request, the Court could have merely said that the
protection afforded by Rule 16(a)(2) was absolute. The Court, instead, went to great
lengths to define the request out of Rule 16(a)(1)(C), thereby implying that Rule
16(a)(1)(C) is where the real test is focused.
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Armstrong lends further support to
this position. Justice Breyer, while not agreeing that Rule 16(a)(1)(C) is limited to
defenses to the "case-in-chief," pointed out that the history of Rule 16 indicates an

' The West Virginia rule is identical to the federal rule. W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(c); FED.R.
CalM. P. 16(a)(1)(C). Because there is no reported history of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the history and jurisprudence of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has been
substituted for the purposes of this Note.
13oSee Tobin Romero, LiberalDiscovery on Selective ProsecutionClaims: Fulfillingthe Promise of

EqualJustice, 84 GEO. L.J. 2043 (1996).
116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
112 Id

at 1485.

133Id.
134I.
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35

This option has some linguistic appeal. However, such an attempt depends
upon a landmark judicial opinion. As previously noted, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia routinely defers to trial court discretion in matters of
discovery.13 6 If the trial court dismisses the defendant's argument, there is little
hope of reversal. Even if the trial court accepts the defendant's argument, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia will likely avoid establishing a
precedent and leave such decisions to case-by-case analysis. Thus, the necessary
rule of law will not be forthcoming.
V. PROPOSAL TO RE-WRITE RULE 16 TO REVERSE THE DISCOVERY BURDEN
The answer offering the best balance between the rights of criminal
defendants to present meritorious defenses and the governmental interest in swift,
sure justice is the reformation of Rule 16 in such a way as to place the burden of
non-production on the prosecution. Two other commentators have suggested just
such a general liberalization of discovery in criminal proceedings. 3 The rationale

Justice Breyer reasoned that:
Rather, the language and legislative history make clear that the Rule's drafters
meant it to provide a broad authorization for defendants' discovery, to be
supplemented if necessary in an appropriate case. Whether or not one can also
find a basis for this kind of discovery in other sources of law, Rule 16(a)(1)(C)
provides one such source, and we should consider whether the defendants'
discovery request satisfied the Rule's requirement that the discovery be "material
to the preparation of the defendant's defense."
Id. at 1491 (Breyer, J., concurring).
136

See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.

"' See Sarokin & Zuckerman, supra note 128, at 1089. Certainly, the liberalization of discovery in
all criminal proceedings would have profound consequences, which are beyond the scope of this Note.
However, in responding to the continuing criticisms of criminal discovery reform, the authors state:
Such arguments have validity, however, only if we are willing to cast
aside certain fundamental tenets of our criminal justice system. If criminal
defendants are truly presumed innocent until proven guilty, then blanket policies
that delay defendants' access to the government's witness lists and deny access
to witness statements until after those witnesses have testified cannot be justified.
These policies are premised upon the fear that defendants will commit further
crimes in order to clear themselves of the charges for which they are being tried.
In sum, the presumption is one of guilt, not innocence. "The contention that
restrictions on discovery are necessary to offset the government's difficult
standard ofproof is equally unsound. The imposition of restrictions on defendants
to counter the government's standard substantially diminishes that standard, and
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is that civil litigants should not be accorded more rights under our system than

criminal defendants."'

Ironically, the civil discovery process is not without its

critics. Many have argued for limitations on civil discovery because of the apparent
costs and court delays.'
Still, the suggestions for placing the burden on the
prosecution to resist discovery have a great deal of appeal."4

thus does not constitute a valid justification for their existence. If the function of
a criminal trial is really a quest for the truth, to maintain that the adversary system
depends on the limitation of defendants' access to information runs contrary to
that quest. Civil litigation is no less adversarial because of its unrestricted
discovery, and the truth is more likely to be uncovered when information is
revealed in time for its meaningful use at trial, than when it is belatedly produced
or entirely withheld.
Id. at 1091-92.
138Commentators observe that:

It is an astonishing anomaly that in federal courts virtually unrestricted discovery
is granted in civil cases, whereas discovery is severely limited in criminal matters.
In other words, where money is involved, all parties receive all relevant
information from their adversaries upon request; but where individual liberty is
at stake, such information can be either withheld by the prosecutor or parcelled
out at a time when it produces the least benefit to the accused.
Id at 1089.
...For a complete analysis of the civil discovery debate, see Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Reforming the New Discovery Rules, 84 GEO. L.J. 61 (1995).
140

The suggestions range from going to full disclosure, much like the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, to liberally modifying the current Rules of Criminal Procedure in the following ways:
Regardless of whether federal courts will recognize a constitutional right of
criminal discovery, it is evident that if discovery is to be afforded any time soon,
it is a task for the legislature. Congress should heed the experience of states, such
as New Jersey, that permit open discovery for criminal defendants. The concerns
that gave rise to the enactment of the Jencks Act on the federal level have not been
borne out in the state courts. By studying the positive conseqrences of such state
court discovery provisions, both the federal government and courts can better
evaluate the usefulness and validity of the Jencks Act and other restrictions on
discovery. We offer the following recommendations:
1. Repeal or modify the Jencks Act
The Jencks Act is a powerful enemy of discovery in federal criminal prosecutions.
It reflects an overly broad policy that disadvantages all defendants for the sake of
trying to prevent the potential misconduct of a few. Denying all defendants access
to pretrial statements made by government witnesses out of the fear that some will
use such information wrongfully can be likened to.outlawing the institution of bail
on the theory that some of those arrested might commit further crimes. Such fears
may indeed be well-founded in specific circumstances, and in such cases, as in
rare instances when ball is not granted, judges should have the authority to impose
particular restrictions on discovery. Otherwise, open discovery should be the rule,
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The State of New Jersey offers an example for possible adoption. New
Jersey has the equivalent of civil procedure discovery in the criminal setting."'

not the exception.
2. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be revised
Drafters of federal criminal discovery rules should adopt the approach taken by
the American Bar Association's Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure
Before Trial. A great number of states have implemented all or most of the ABA
Standards, which advocate broad discovery provisions, through both legislation
and court rulings.
3. The federal government must assume the burden to show cause for limiting
disclosure
For discovery rules to work fairly and efficiently, the burden must be placed on
the prosecution to make a prima facie showing that disclosure should be restricted
in specific instances. Absent such a showing, defendants should be granted early
and complete disclosure of all relevant information.
Sarokin & Zuckerman, supra note 128, at 1108-10 (citations omitted).
'4'

New Jersey Rules Governing Criminal Practice provide:
3:13-3. Discovery and Inspection
(c) Discovery by the Defendant The prosecutor shall permit defendant to inspect
and copy or photograph the following relevant material if not given as part of the
discovery package under section (b):
(1) books, tangible objects, papers or documents obtained from or belonging to
the defendant;
(2) records of statements or confessions, signed or unsigned, by the defendant or
copies thereof, and a summary of any admissions or declarations against penal
interest made by the defendant that are known to the prosecution but not recorded;
(3) results or reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests
or experiments made in connection with the matter or copies thereof, which are
within the possession, custody or control of the prosecutor,
(4) reports or records of prior convictions of the defendant;
(5) books, papers, documents, or copies thereof, or tangible objects, buildings or
places which are within the possession, custody or control of the prosecutor;
(6) names and addresses of any persons whom the prosecutor knows to have
relevant evidence or information including a designation by the prosecutor as to
which of those persons may be called as witnesses;
(7) record of statements, signed or unsigned, by such persons or by codefendants which are within the possession, custody or control of the prosecutor
and any relevant record of prior conviction of such persons;
(8) police reports which are within the possession, custody, or control of the
prosecutor,
(9) names and addresses of each person whom the prosecutor expects to call to
trial as an expert witness, the expert's qualifications, the subject matter on which
the expert is expected to testify, a copy of the report, if any, of such expert
witness, or if no report is prepared, a statement of the facts and opinions to which
the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.
Except in the penalty phase of a capital case if this information is requested and
not finished 30 days in advance of trial, the expert witness may, upon application
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New Jersey's criminal procedure allows for the pretrial production of police
reports,1 42 witness statements, 43 and other document.4 ' However, New Jersey's
liberal discovery rule is reciprocal. If a defendant chooses to make use of the liberal
discovery rule, the prosecution has the right to similar discovery in return. 45 The
New Jersey system, like many other state systems, leaves the choice of initiating the
discovery process to the defendant' 6
The New Jersey approach provides the best alternative to the status quo in
West Virginia, at least where psychological defenses are concerned. As shown in
Sections I[ and II, the mentally ill defendant is being deprived of viable defenses
under the current rules. If Rogers had the benefit of N.J. R. Crim. P. 3:13-3(c), the
by the defendant, be barred from testifying at trial.
N.J. R
142

CRM. P. 3:13-3(c).

N.J. RL CRIvL P. 3:13-3(c)(8).

4 N.J. R. CRuM. P. 3:13-3(c)(7).
114

N.J. R. CRm. P. 3:13-3(c)(5).

'4

Rule 3:13-3(d) provides:

(d) Discovery by the State. A defendant shall permit the State to inspect and
copy or photograph the following relevant material if not given as part of the
discovery package under section (b):
(1) results or reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests
or experiments made in connection with the matter or copies thereof, which are
within the possession, custody or control of defense counsel;
(2) any relevant books, papers, documents or tangible objects, buildings or places
or copies thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of defense
counsel;
(3) the names and addresses of those persons known to defendant who may be
called as witnesses at trial and their written statements, if any, including
memoranda reporting or summarizing their oral statements;
(4) written statements, if any, including any memoranda reporting or
summarizing the oral statements, made by any witnesses whom the State may call
as a witness at trial;
(5) names and address of each person whom the defense expects to call to trial
as an expert witness, the expert's qualifications, the subject matter on which the
expert is expected to testify, and a copy of the report, if any, of such expert
witness, or if no report is prepared, a statement of the facts and opinions to which
the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.
Except in the penalty phase of a capital case if this information is requested and
not furnished 30 days in advance of trial the expert may, upon application by the
prosecutor, be barred from testifying at trial.
N.J. 1L CRM. P. 3:13-3(d).
146Sarokin & Zuckerman, supra note 128, at 1108 n.91.
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prosecution would be forced to seek relief to avoid the production requirements.
The prosecutor would have to show special circumstances to obtain this relief.
Neither the defense psychiatrist nor the defense attorney would be forced to justify
their request and thereby undermine Rogers' defense before it even begins. In such
a situation, both defense and prosecution experts would operate from the same
information. Thus, the balanced picture that concerned the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia in Duell would come to pass.
By reversing the burden of production so that full disclosure is encouraged
in all but the most exigent circumstances, the New Jersey alternative offers the best
possible situation for the defendant and the system alike. Pretrial disclosure would
enable the forensic experts to function with full information. 47 In such an
environment, the odds are increased that general agreement will be reached between
the experts. 41 In addition, the likelihood of plea negotiation may increase. 149 Past
experience shows that, where proper psychological evaluations are conducted, trial
In this regard, the liberated discovery
of the matter is rarely necessary.'
environment may lead to greater judicial efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION

The mentally ill, much like the indigent, deserve constitutional protection.
Indigent defendants receive the protection of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment precisely because they are powerless to protect their rights
without the help of the State. The mentally ill are in a similar situation. Without the
aid of the State, in the form of pretrial discovery, the mentally ill become powerless
to assert their rights through the presentation of psychiatric testimony. The United
States Supreme Court recognized an indigent's right to psychiatric testimony in
Ake.'
Utilizing the rationale of the Court in Ake, there would appear to be due

'4

See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.

148 See

supra note 46 and accompanying text.

149 Brennan, supra note 5, at 2. Then Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., noted that "a

guilty defendant is more likely to plea-bargain and plead if the prosecution discloses to him a strong

government case." Id.
'5o See supra note 45 and accompanying text. In addition, the Baltimore City-study showed that, out
of 127 defendants asserting a defense of Not Criminally Responsible (NCR), all but 16 dropped the
defense before trial, 13 of those were stipulated to by the prosecution, one was dropped on a
technicality, and only two went to trial with opposing experts, with one being found guilty. See
Janofsky et al., supra note 39, at 207.
'

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985), aft'd,778 P.2d 460 (Okla. Crin. App. 1989).
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process reasons for assuring that all who warrant a psychiatric defense be allowed
to present such a defense. As one commentator put it, "Conflating many issues into
single rhetorical attacks runs the grave risk of depriving mentally disordered
defendants of their right, both moral and constitutional, to have a detailed analysis
state presented to the jury when it is at issue as an element of the
of their mental
152
.....
offense
Denying forensic psychologists who are asked to assist our legal system the
necessary information upon which to form their opinions encourages them to ignore
their own scientific realities. "Malingering" is a real concern which forensic
psychologists must grapple with everyday. The literature indicates that exposure to
the fullest possible range of "collateral information" is the only way to begin to
ferret out the pretenders. 5 ' Our legal system cannot continue to seek the assistance
of these experts and deny them and their patients the tools necessary for them to be
accurate in their opinions.
Beyond the possible due process implications, the provision of pretrial
discovery to defendants for the purposes of asserting a defense based upon mental
disease or defect is the only way to ensure the sanctity of the process. To preclude
the discovery of this vital information, at the very least, casts a shadow of
illegitimacy on the process, and, at worst, perpetuates a fraud upon the juries of this
country. Finally, the loosening of the discovery noose promises concrete advantages
to the criminal justice system in the way of increased agreement between experts,
increased plea bargaining, and less gamesmanship in the administration of justice.
It's time to stop "kicking the dog" and open up the criminal discovery process.
J. Robert Russell

* Golding & Roesch, supra note 27, at 424 (citations omitted).
m See supranotes 79-88 and accompanying text.

* I would like to thank Patricia L. Dettori, Esq. and James M. Pool, Esq. for their assistance and
support in the preparation of this article. I also want to thank my family for their love, support and
encouragement in this endeavor, especially my wife and partner, Cecilia J. Graves. Without her
uncompromising love and sagely wisdom, this article would not have been possible. I dedicate this
Note to the memory of my father, Winston N. Russell.
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